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MEANS, MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY – DISTORTION OF PUBLIC POLICY 
MAKING PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT DATA 
ABSTRACT: 
Regulatory authorities are increasingly relying on performance data for public policy making 
purposes. However, this reliance necessarily assumes that the data is free from material 
distortion. This paper provides a conceptual framework for understanding the ‘means’, 
‘motive’ and ‘opportunity’ for distorting data employed in high stakes performance 
management programmes. We present empirical evidence which suggests that the use of data 
drawn entirely from financial statements is by no means a guarantee of a distortion free 
depiction of performance. In addition, we provide econometric evidence of some important 
determinants of performance data distortion. Taken as a whole, the following analysis 
provides a comprehensive picture of the salient matters which must be addressed in order to 
ensure accurate data for public policy making purposes. 




Regulatory authorities are increasingly relying on local government performance data for 
public policy making purposes. For instance, the Queensland Local Government Reform 
Commission placed heavy emphasis on the assessment of local government financial 
sustainability in prosecuting the case for reducing the number of councils in the state from 
157 to just 73 in 2007/08 (Drew et al.  2016). In similar vein, the New South Wales (NSW) 
Office of Local Government recently emphasised the achievement of financial ratio 
benchmarks as a crucial element of its Fit for the Future (FFTF) programme. 
FFTF was a programme of local government reform designed to enhance the financial 
sustainability of the NSW local government sector. It was primarily a response to a report by 
the Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP 2013: 7) which concluded that 
‘the financial sustainability of many councils – and their capacity to deliver services 
communities need – has declined, and a significant number are near crisis point’. Arguably, 
the ILGRP report contained a number of good suggestions on the need to reform rate 
pegging, introduce mandatory professional development for councillors, adopt minimum two 
year terms for mayors and introduce central auditing (ILGRP 2013). However, in its response 
to the Report the NSW government focussed primarily on the controversial recommendation 
that ‘structural reform – including amalgamations – is another essential component of reform’ 
(ILGRP 2013: 15). Thus, in September 2014 the NSW government released its FFTF 
programme which focussed on the assessment of council performance according to seven 
ratios drawn from the financial statements along with the scale recommendations made by the 
ILGRP. Ultimately, these criteria were used to justify public policy centred on forced 
amalgamation. 
For good public policy decisions to be made it is clearly critical for performance data to be 




audited financial statements would be a sound basis for compiling performance indicators. 
We evaluate this assumption by testing for the presence of unexpected accounting estimates 
in the financial statements of NSW councils. Specifically, we identify unexplained changes 
to: (i) depreciation accruals, (ii) estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard and 
(iii) estimates of required annual maintenance. This is largely achieved by comparing the 
estimates provided for the financial year relevant to the FFTF programme with estimates 
which had been provided in earlier periods (with adjustments to reflect relevant expenditure 
over the current period). Because FFTF was a high stakes performance management 
programme an analysis of this type can shed important light on both the reliability of 
financial data for public policy making and also on the determinants of data distortion. We 
note that an analysis of financial data distortion in the context of high stakes performance 
management has not been comprehensively dealt with in the scholarly literature – this study 
therefore remedies an important gap. Moreover, knowledge of the determinants of data 
distortion can help inform the design of future performance management regimes and thus 
lead to better decision making. 
This paper extends Bevan and Hood’s (2006) seminal work on ‘motive’ and ‘opportunity’ for 
gaming in public policy programmes in a number of important ways. First, we address the 
missing third element of all good detective mysteries – ‘means’ – by recourse to the 
pioneering work of Copeland (1968) on income smoothing. In particular, we note that 
Copeland’s (1968) ideal attributes for accounting devices which might be successfully 
employed to shift profits from more successful periods to less successful periods by 
executives of private business also lend themselves to the practice of improving the 
appearance of performance by public sector executives. The second way in which we extend 
the extant literature is by demonstrating an empirical technique to discern common ‘motive’ 




of scholarly literature on public policy performance management distortion is by exploiting 
the unique combination of unaudited and audited financial statement data to demonstrate the 
relative importance of an audit hole for providing ‘opportunity’. 
The paper itself is divided into six main parts. Section two provides important contextual 
information including details of the performance indicators employed by the NSW 
government to establish empirical legitimacy for the policy process. Section three sets out the 
categorical trinity of detection method as it applies to public policy process and the 
hypotheses which we test in response to ‘means’, ‘motive’ and ‘opportunity’. Section four 
provides detail of the empirical strategy employed whilst section five discusses the results in 
terms of the aforementioned hypotheses. We conclude our paper with some observations on 
the importance of the analysis for the design of future public policy reform programmes.  
2. Fit For The Future as Policy Process 
This study is located within the broader policy failure literature, with specific reference to 
public policy which is predicated on empirical evidence. Success in public policy can be 
assessed according to a number of potentially independent dimensions: ‘programmatic 
success’ which emphasises the effectiveness, efficiency and resilience indicators associated 
with an intervention; ‘political success’ which focusses on media and public perceptions, 
political inquiries and political fatalities and ‘process success’ which emphasises political 
legitimacy in formulation of options as well as innovation and influence (Marsh and 
McConnell, 2010). We believe that the ‘process success’ of a public policy might also be 
profitably assessed with reference to its empirical legitimacy. To this end we examine the 
degree of data distortion (referred to as ‘gaming’ in the literature) associated with the FFTF 
metrics. Moreover, we seek to explicate on the ‘means’, ‘motives’ and ‘opportunities’ in 




New South Wales is Australia’s largest state representing just under a third of the nation’s 
population in the most recent census (ABS 2011). At the time of FFTF, Local government in 
NSW was comprised of 152 general-purpose councils regulated by the state Office of Local 
Government (OLG) directed by the NSW Minister for Local Government. Local government 
in Australia is not recognised in the national constitution and thus exists as a creature of state 
statute – able to be forcibly amalgamated, put into administration or have its boundaries and 
responsibilities changed at the direction of the Minister (subject to the constraint of 
procedural fairness which applies to administrative decision making; Twomey 2012). In 
contrast to most other developed nations, local government in NSW has a limited remit of 
services – concentrated on waste collection, provision of road infrastructure, development 
planning and recreation facilities. Welfare services are largely the task of the Commonwealth 
whilst the state government is responsible for most education, health and policing services.  
NSW municipal elections are conducted on the second Saturday of September every four 
years (Electoral Commission NSW 2014). Mayors are directly elected for just over a fifth of 
NSW councils – in all other cases councillors themselves elect the Mayor annually. Elected 
representatives are responsible for appointing a General Manager (GM) as and when the 
position becomes available, for a maximum contracted period of five years. The GM is tasked 
with implementing the vision of the elected representatives and is responsible for the 
appointment of all staff including the responsible accounting officer (RAO). In most 
metropolitan councils (principally the 43 councils of the Greater Sydney region) the RAO is a 
member of one of Australia’s two peak accounting bodies, Certified Practising Accountants 
(CPA) or the Australian Institute of Chartered Accountants (ICAA). However, there is no 
legislative requirement for membership of these bodies. Regional and rural councils (which 





All financial statements are required to be passed by a resolution of the elected 
representatives and include a statement pursuant to s413(2)(c) of the Local Government Act 
(1993) that the information contained is a fair representation of the council’s financial 
position and that the financial report is not false or misleading in any way. This statement of 
fair representation is signed by the Mayor, one councillor, the GM and the RAO. A recent 
report by the NSW Auditor-General (Audit Office NSW 2012) decried the lack of significant 
penalties for councillor and staff misconduct under the Local Government Act (1993). 
Further, the Minister is only able to apply a maximum penalty of suspension for one month 
for serious misconduct, whilst the NSW Governor has the discretion to disqualify an 
individual from holding civic office for a maximum period of five years. Only about half of 
the NSW councils have audit committees – most of which have little independence – 
commonly chaired by the RAO or a councillor (ILGRP 2013). The council executive is 
responsible for selecting the Auditor of financial statements. PWC is the only ‘Big 4’ auditor 
operating in the sector and audits just 21 councils, all of which are located in metropolitan 
areas.  
In August 2011 the Minister for Local Government established the Independent Local 
Government Review Panel (ILGRP) to provide recommendations to improve the financial 
sustainability of the sector. Due to a change of Premier and subsequent cabinet reshuffle the 
government did not respond to the final report of the ILGRP (October 2013) until October 
2014. The state government’s response – FFTF – required councils to demonstrate that they 
were financially sustainable according to seven financial ratios derived entirely from 
municipal financial reports (see Table 1). Councils which were unable to show that they were 
both ‘fit’ (according to the seven financial ratios) alongside possessing the required scale 
were instructed to complete a voluntary amalgamation proposal. However, just four councils 




generous incentives for voluntary amalgamation (see, Drew and Dollery 2015b). As a result 
FFTF was recast as a forced amalgamation programme in December 2015. At the time of 
writing, the final number of forced amalgamations is uncertain owing to a number of 
outstanding legal challenges (NSW Government 2016).  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Significantly, all but one of the FFTF performance management ratios were derived entirely 
from financial statement inputs (the ‘efficiency’ ratio incorporated a population size input 
derived from the ABS). However, not all of the financial data contained within the NSW 
local government financial statements is subjected to auditing – in particular, two of the items 
used to calculate the FFTF ratios are derived from the unaudited special schedules. Moreover, 
the scholarly literature has long identified inconsistencies in audited depreciation accrual 
data. In this study we focus on three items from the financial statements in order to test 
hypotheses associated with our explication of ‘means’, ‘motive’ and ‘opportunity’: 
 
(i) Depreciation: Depreciation is the allocation of the cost of a non-current 
asset over the course of its useful life. Allocation of depreciation expense 
requires a good deal of professional judgement, specifically in terms of 
deciding on an appropriate depreciation methodology (from a virtually 
unlimited number of options) and estimating the useful life of the asset. 
Moreover, it has long been identified as a ‘means’ for municipal 
executives to manipulate performance data (see, for instance, Pilcher 
(2005; 2006; Pilcher and Van Der Zahn 2010; Drew and Dollery 2015a). 
Manipulation of depreciation accruals has the potential to distort the 
Operating, ‘efficiency’, and Buildings and Infrastructure Renewal ratios 




accruals (which is just over a fifth of total council expenditure in NSW) 
means that small shifts in depreciation accrual practice can result in very 
material increases to performance management ratios.  
 
(ii) Cost to Bring to Satisfactory Standard: This information is provided in 
the unaudited Special Schedule 7 and is used to calculate the 
infrastructure backlog ratio (TCorp 2013). The financial statements define 
this quantum as:  
‘[S]atisfying expectations or needs, leaving no room for complaint …. 
The estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard is the amount 
of money that is required to be spent on an asset to ensure that it is in a 
satisfactory standard. This estimated cost should not include any planned 
enhancements (i.e.: to heighten, intensify or improve the facilities)’ (see, 
for instance, Hay Shire Council, 2014). 
Because the data is not audited, it represents an important opportunity for 
deliberate distortion. However, one should be mindful that the Special 
Schedule is part of the financial statements and therefore needs to be 
passed by the elected body of the council and certified as fair and free 
from false and misleading claims. 
 
(iii) Required Annual Maintenance: This information is also provided solely 
in Special Schedule 7 and is used to calculate the Asset Maintenance 
ratio. Required Annual Maintenance is defined as ‘what should be spent 






It will be noted that these three financial statement items hold the potential to materially 
distort five of the seven performance management ratios employed in the FFTF program. We 
now review the literature on the categorical trinity of detection in order to develop hypotheses 
which will allow us to assess the process dimension of the NSW forced amalgamation public 
policy.  
 
3. The Categorical Trinity of Detection and Public Policy Performance Management 
Gaming of public performance management regimes predicated on data drawn principally 
from financial statement items has largely escaped the attention of public administration 
scholars. This neglect might have arisen due to a common misconception that audited 
financial statements contain objective error free accounting data (Drew and Dollery, 2015). 
However, Copeland’s (1968) time series study of income smoothing amongst New York 
Stock Exchange companies should alert us to the fact that audited financial data is merely an 
abstraction of reality and thus far from ontological truth – it also suggests the types of 
accounting items most likely to suffer distortion. We suggest that the practice of income 
smoothing by private business executives is not entirely dissimilar to the practice of 
performance management gaming by public sector executives: in both cases the emphasis is 
on manipulating accounting data which is most likely to project a favourable impression of 
performance without detection. Moreover, the motivation for income smoothing – self-
interest – is the same as the motivation generally attributed to individuals which participate in 
public performance management gaming (more on this below). 
Of particular interest to our current inquiry is Copeland’s (1968) articulation of attributes 
which make certain accounting items attractive to executives wishing to project a favourable 




manipulating accounting items which do not commit the unit to any further action. 
Manipulation of data that commits the council to future actions may (i) have a deleterious 
effect on future performance and is thus unsatisfactory in a continuous performance 
management system; similarly, it may (ii) increase the likelihood of detection; and (iii) 
increase the difficulty in manipulating performance in future years. The second desirable 
attribute of ‘malleable’ accounting data is that the item in question is based on professional 
judgement. Professional judgement – unlike other accounting ‘facts’ – is neither right nor 
wrong. Moreover, the complexity of a given professional judgement is proportional to the 
range of data manipulation possible. This is because complex professional judgements 
involve a larger number of salient factors, each of which can be ‘adjusted’ to alter the final 
financial figure. The third important characteristic of data which might make it suitable for 
distorting the picture of performance is its ability to result in material shifts. The final 
attribute of accounting data which lends itself to selection for manipulative purposes is where 
the figures do not involve a real transaction with a second party. The object of data 
manipulation is to give the appearance of improved performance without actually changing 
performance. 
In the following empirical work we test the hypothesis that accounting data can become the 
means of distorting public policy performance management regimes. Specifically we test the 
degree of unexpected (or unexplained) movement in the depreciation accrual data in the first 
accounting period subsequent to communication of the performance ratios which would be 
used for the empirical legitimisation of FFTF1. 
Now that we have explored the ‘means’ for manipulating public policy management regimes 
based on financial data one naturally turns to the question of why an executive would choose 
to do so. Perhaps the best known work on public sector motivation is Julian Le Grand’s 





(2003) dichotomy of ‘knights’ and ‘knaves’. Le Grand (2003, p. 25) defines a ‘knave’ as an 
‘individual whose principal concern is to further his or her self-interest…by any means, legal 
or illegal’. By way of contrast, ‘knights’ are ‘individuals who are motivated to help others for 
no private reward, and indeed who may undertake such activities to the detriment of their 
own private interests’ (Le Grand, 2003, p. 27). The literature largely assumes that gaming is 
the result of knaves responding to self-interest incentives (see, for instance, Le Grand 2010; 
Bevan and Hood 2006; Bohte and Meier, 2000). However, it is clear to us that certain 
circumstances could give rise to gaming by knights. For instance, several council executives 
drew attention to the fact that local governments were often the major employer in rural and 
regional areas and that job losses associated with amalgamation would ‘devastate local 
families and our local economy’ reducing many former council bureaucracies to ‘little more 
than a lawn mowing service’ (Tweed Daily News, 2013). Thus, it is clear that in high stakes 
environments such as this, concern for the effect on families and local economies might 
motivate knights to also ‘game’ the data. In this respect, the beliefs of executives about the 
likelihood of detection and the personal outcomes arising from the forced amalgamations 
would seem critical to any evaluation of motive: gaming under the circumstances of likely 
detection (and consequences) suggests knightly motives as does gaming when there might be 
reasonable cause for belief that the executive would be successful in gaining a comparable 
position in a newly amalgamated entity. Unfortunately, ‘assessing intent in any 
administrative process is difficult’ – those who have committed data distortion offences are 
unlikely to admit to their behaviour, let alone co-operate with inquiries aimed at uncovering 
intent (Bohte and Meier, 2000, p. 177; Copeland, 1968). However, it is certainly the case that 
prima facie motives existed for both knaves and knights in relation to FFTF. Moreover, there 




sustainability test, “played games” with their books by extending the useful life of their 
public assets to an “unrealistic” age’ (Bell, 2015).  
One way of identifying deliberate distortion – as opposed to recording error – is to examine 
whether distortions of the three accounting items tend to operate in the same direction. 
Whether prompted by knightly altruism or knavish self-interest the behaviour should be 
directed towards achieving a common goal. Accordingly, in the following empirical work we 
test the hypothesis that unexpected accounting items are attributable to a single motive by 
subjecting the unexpected depreciation, estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory 
standard and required annual maintenance items to a multiple regression analysis aimed at 
establishing the statistical significance and direction of association.  
The matter of ‘opportunity’ has been comprehensively addressed in the literature. In 
particular, it has long been recognised that advanced knowledge of metrics and associated 
benchmarks has clear implications for providing potential ‘gamers’ with the time to distort 
data. This is particularly important in the case of financial data given that it is subject to fixed 
reporting times: in the case of FFTF councils were made aware of the broad empirical 
approach and data to be used in council assessments in the April 2013 TCorp report, well in 
advance of the June 30 2014 accounting reporting date. Related to the issue of advanced 
knowledge of metrics and benchmarks is the matter of unpredictability – in particular, 
introducing temporal unpredictability has been identified in the scholarly literature as an 
efficacious means of preventing deliberate data distortions (Bevan and Hood, 2006). 
However, temporal unpredictability is difficult to achieve when financial statement data is 
employed.  
The presence of an audit hole has also been identified in the literature as creating the 
opportunity for distortion of public performance data (Bevan and Hood, 2006). When it 




assuming that this problem is of little relevance. However, the Australian Auditing Standard 
(ASA 200) only requires reasonable assurance that financial statements are free of material 
misstatement, not absolute assurance (Drew and Dollery, 2015a). Moreover, what might be 
an immaterial error in an accounting sense could very well be critical in a performance 
management regime – particularly if the extant performance of a council only fell marginally 
short of a benchmark known in advance. In addition, as we have seen, not all of the data 
contained in the NSW council financial statements is subject to audit opinion: for instance, 
the estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard and required annual maintenance 
data is not audited. To compound matters somewhat the two pieces of critical unaudited data 
were not satisfactorily defined – creating ‘interpretation’ space for would be gamers. 
Moreover, the literature points to enhanced ‘opportunity’ when there is an absence of public 
scrutiny. Gaming of financial data requires sophisticated analysis to detect and often also 
involves high information costs. If potential ‘gamers’ believe that there is an absence of 
public scrutiny – particularly academic scrutiny – then they may feel that there is little chance 
of detection (as we have seen this is also important in the calculus of potential knaves). 
Likewise, if executives feel that a Nelsonian eye will be applied to the data – that politicians 
and regulators are more concerned with the appearance of improvement rather than actual 
improvement – then this may be seen as a tacit invitation to distort data (Bevan and Hood, 
2006). 
We can test the hypothesis that gaming is more likely to occur when an audit hole exists by 
comparing the levels of distortion present in audited financial data (depreciation accruals) to 
those present in the unaudited special schedule items (estimated cost to bring assets to a 
satisfactory standard and required annual maintenance). 
We now outline the empirical strategy adopted to calculate the unexpected movement in the 




4. Empirical Strategy for Estimating Unexpected Financial Statement Items 
In order to determine the extent of data manipulation for the three chosen measures we 
adopted the general approach for calculating unexpected financial statement items employed 
by Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) developed from the earlier work of Hribar and Collins 
(2002) and Mulford and Comiskey (2002). This is the approach also adopted by Pilcher and 
Van der Zahn (2010) in the context of NSW municipal income smoothing. Unexpected 
accounting data is essentially the unexplained movement in items from one accounting period 
to the next. We use these measures of data distortion to test our three hypotheses derived 
from the categorical trinity of detection – including, our test of common motive which 
discerns deliberate distortion (or gaming) from mere recording error. We define the 
unexpected financial statement items as: 
 
Uj,t = ((Rj,t – Ej,t) / Rj,t-1) *100 
 
Where U is the unexpected change for council j at time t (UDEPR is unexpected 
depreciation; USS is unexpected cost to bring to a satisfactory standard and UREQ is 
unexpected required maintenance), R is the reported quantum and E is the expected quantum 
for each item. It will be noted that we have chosen to deflate the unexpected quantum (the 
numerator in the expression above) by the item under consideration rather than using a 
constant denominator (total assets) as per Marquardt and Wiedman (2004). This is because 
our study focuses on how the individual financial statement items might be manipulated with 
respect to performance management instruments rather than the earnings management 





A key variable in the unexpected change algorithm is the expected quantum. This variable is 




EDeprj,t = (Depr j,t-1/IPPE j,t-1 ) * IPPE j,t 
 
Where EDepr is the expected depreciation of council j at time t, Depr is the reported 
depreciation of council j at time t-1, and IPPE is the depreciable infrastructure, property, 
plant and equipment values (drawn from the notes to the financial statements) at the time 
indicated by the subscript. It will be noted that we have elected to use the depreciable portion 
of IPPE rather than the gross IPPE used in the ground-breaking work of Pilcher and Van der 
Zahn (2010) and Marquardt and Wiedman (2004). This is an important innovation given that 
only the depreciable component of IPPE has any relevance to the rate of depreciation 
employed in the previous period (represented by the numerator above). Given that just over 
37% of gross IPPE items from NSW municipalities are non-depreciable (such as bulk 
earthworks), failure to adjust for these items could compromise the results. A limitation of 
this work (acknowledged also in previous studies) is that the exact timing of asset 
acquisitions during the financial year is not publicly available and thus could result in minor 
distortion of data. 
 
Unexpected Cost to Bring to Satisfactory Standard 
 





Where ESS is the estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard for council j at time 
t, SS is the cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard reported in the previous period, ACT 
is the actual maintenance reported for the asset base in the previous period and REQ is the 
required maintenance reported for the asset base in the previous period. Thus the ESS 
represents the previous cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard adjusted for required 
maintenance not undertaken. It is acknowledged that there is potential for upside (but not 
downside) adjustments to ESS over a financial year owing to an unpredicted deterioration of 
assets arising from, for instance, a natural disaster.  
 
Unexpected Required Maintenance 
 
EREQ = REQ j,t-1 + (REQ j,t-1 – ACT j,t-1) 
 
Where EREQ is the estimated required maintenance and all other terms are defined as per the 
previous expression. Essentially, EREQ is the required maintenance from the previous 
financial statement adjusted for the maintenance deficit (or surplus) stated in the previous 
period. Once again there is some potential for slight upward (but not downward) revisions 
owing to unpredicted movements in maintenance requirements. However, as we shall see 
below, possible revisions do not explain the scale or the direction of unexpected changes to 
financial statement items identified in our analysis.  
Table 2 provides descriptive data for each of the variables which we test. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 




The first matter which we have set out to address is the question regarding whether basing 
performance management data on financial statement inputs is in any way a guarantee of 
empirical legitimacy in public policy process. We have argued that the attributes which make 
some accounting items attractive for income smoothing purposes also lend themselves to 
performance management gaming objectives. All three accounting items which we have set 
out to examine fit Copeland’s criteria: however, only one item (depreciation accruals) is 
subject to auditor examination. Therefore, in order for us to avoid conflating our ‘means’ 
hypothesis with our ‘opportunity’ hypothesis we will restrict our comments to the unexpected 
depreciation data at this point. 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for the unexpected financial statement items 
relating to the financial year ending 30 June 2014. Data on various measures of central 
tendency and spread are presented for the entire state, before being disaggregated into Greater 
Sydney and Outside Greater Sydney cohorts. The typical NSW council (represented by the 
median) had unexplained depreciation of just 0.2% which is probably really a reflection of 
the minor upside error which we recognised in our discussion of the empirical strategy 
employed. However, when we move to quartile one data we are faced with the fact that 25 
percent of councils had unexplained reduction in depreciation greater than 6.3%. As noted 
earlier depreciation accounts for around a fifth of NSW council expenditure so it is clear that 
this degree of distortion would have had a material effect on the empirical legitimacy of three 
of the seven metrics employed in FFTF. Moreover, the far majority of councils which lay 
between the median and first quartile also had unexplained reductions in depreciation, thus 
suggesting that around half of the councils assessed may have gamed the performance 
management regime. Indeed, one council had unexplained reduction in depreciation of over 




ideal attributes articulated by Copeland (1968) can be used as a ‘means’ for distortion of 
performance management regimes. 
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
Somewhat puzzling is the fact that around half of the councils had unexplained increases in 
depreciation accruals. As noted, the empirical technique is subject to some upside error. 
However, it is clear that at least the top quartile of councils made significant positive 
adjustments to their depreciation accrual data. Part of the explanation for this observation 
may lay in the fact that many councils took the opportunity to revise their depreciation 
schedules as part of the FFTF process. Where this occurred the unexpected data really 
reflects measurement error from previous periods, rather than a deliberate attempt to game 
the performance management regime. However, there is also the possibility that some 
councils may have deliberately revised their depreciation expense up, in order to avoid 
amalgamation. As it stood, FFTF required councils to seek out their own amalgamation 
partners in the event that they did not meet the criteria (and did not have an attainable plan to 
do so)2. This necessarily implied that one had to find an attractive partner. Thus by 
exaggerating the poor state that a council might have found itself in (as measured by the 
FFTF criteria) it might have been possible to become such an unattractive prospect that no 
adjoining municipality was willing to even countenance amalgamation! If this explanation for 
the upward revision of depreciation expense (which incidentally is supported by anecdotal 
evidence) is valid then we might reasonably expect to find that the adjustments to the other 
two accounting items also occurred in the same direction.  
If the movement in the various unexpected items derive from a single motive, then we would 
expect there to be a statistically significant association between the three accounting items 
which we examine. Table 4 presents the results of three multiple regression models which 




with the model employed by Pilcher and Van der Zahn (2010) (with the addition of the 
Special Schedule 7 items and the depreciation rate (defined as the depreciation accrual as a 
percentage of depreciable IPPE) which have resulted in a much higher coefficient of 
determination). We find evidence of statistically significant associations for each of the three 
accounting items. Moreover, for each of the statistically significant associations the sign of 
the coefficient suggests that manipulation generally occurred in the same direction. For 
instance unexpected depreciation was positively associated with unexpected cost to bring 
assets to a satisfactory standard (at the 5% level of statistical significance) as was unexpected 
required annual maintenance (at the 1% level of statistical significance). When one considers 
the potential for minor upside error arising from the unexpected item algorithms and the fact 
that in some cases distortions may have been due to measurement error the level of statistical 
significance and size of the coefficients is rather startling. We therefore conclude that the 
explanation of distortions arising in the main from a single ‘motive’ – gaming – is validated 
by the empirical evidence. Moreover, we have demonstrated an important advance in the 
empirical detection of gaming in performance management regimes.  
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
Two other points of interest may be derived from the regressions presented in Table 4. First, 
the existing depreciation rate is a highly statistically significant determinant of unexpected 
depreciation. That is, low depreciation rates are associated with further understatement of 
depreciation and vice versa. This may suggest that council executives may tend towards serial 
offending and that there is thus a certain predictability about this particular type of data 
manipulation. The result also provides strong support for the call by Drew and Dollery 
(2015a) for regulatory bodies to include a depreciation rate indicator as part of all 
performance monitoring regimes. Second, there was a statistically significant negative 




unexpected cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard. Specifically a 1% increase in the 
number of households was associated with a 0.4% underestimate of unexpected cost to bring 
assets to a satisfactory standard. Prima facie this suggests that larger councils are more likely 
to underestimate unexpected cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard, once again 
providing a basis for predicting performance data distortion. 
The third hypothesis arising from our explication of the categorical trinity of detection tests 
whether the amount of data distortion might be relatively greater for unaudited items than for 
audited items. FFTF represents a unique opportunity to test the relative influence of audit 
oversight on data distortion because it employs both audited and unaudited financial data. 
Table 3 clearly demonstrates that distortion of the two unaudited accounting items was far 
greater than the distortion of the audited item. For instance, whilst the typical council (as 
measured by the median) only had negligible levels of movement in unexpected depreciation 
accruals, the typical movement in the estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard 
and required annual maintenance was relatively large (an unexplained reduction of 13.5% 
and 11.4% respectively). Moreover the first quartile data suggests even larger disparities: 
unexpected downward adjustment of depreciation accruals in the order of 6.3% compared to 
unexpected reductions of estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory standard and required 
annual maintenance of 48.6% and 48.8% respectively. It is thus reasonable on the basis of 
this evidence to suggest that auditing of accounting data mutes the ‘opportunity’ for gaming 
of financial statement items.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The scholarly literature suggests that public policy success can be appraised according to 
three dimensions: process, programmatic and political success (Marsh and McConnell, 2010). 




cannot be viewed as a success. In particular the data upon which empirical legitimacy rested 
has been shown to be the subject of high levels of deliberate distortion. Whether this process 
failure is subsequently translated into programmatic or political failure only time can tell. 
However, if the decision to amalgamate councils has been based on heavily distorted data 
then one could assume that the chances of programmatic success (as measured by the 
objective of enhanced financial sustainability) are less likely. Moreover, if programmatic 
success is not forthcoming before the next NSW state government election in March 2019, 
then it is not unreasonable to suspect that this might result also in political failure (Grant et al. 
2015). 
The broad aim of this paper was to explicate on the categorical trinity of detection with 
reference to public policy performance management regimes. In so doing we developed three 
hypotheses related to ‘means’, ‘motive’ and ‘opportunity’ which were amenable to empirical 
testing.  
First, we borrowed from the income smoothing literature to outline the characteristics of 
accounting data items which best lend themselves to manipulation aimed at enhancing the 
impression of performance. We then tested one such item (depreciation), and demonstrated 
that it was indeed subject to high levels of unexplained distortions.  
Second, we argued that the common interpretation of a prominent dichotomy of public sector 
motivation drawn from the literature need not always hold true – showing how knightly 
motivations could also result in gaming behaviour in circumstances such as the ones which 
faced NSW councils during the FFTF process. Whilst agreeing with other prominent scholars 
that it was difficult to obtain data on motivation for gaming per se, we were able to develop a 
hypothesis and empirical strategy to discern deliberate distortions arising from a common 
‘motive’ from measurement error. Our evidence showed that there was a statistically 




was indeed a valid explanation of the observed unexpected movement in data. In addition, 
our econometric evidence pointed to other determinants of gaming in accounting data used to 
establish empirical legitimacy in public policy process. Specifically, we found empirical 
evidence which suggested serial offending with regards to data distortion as well as an 
association between the size of the council and unexplained data distortion.  
Our third hypothesis drawn from the explication of the categorical trinity of detection, related 
to the matter of ‘opportunity’. It has long been conjectured that the presence of an audit hole 
provides opportunity for individuals intending to subvert performance management regimes. 
The unique combination of unaudited and audited financial statement data employed in the 
FFTF policy provided us with an ideal natural experiment to test what had hitherto been 
conjecture. Our comparison of unexpected movements in audited depreciation items against 
unaudited special schedule 7 items confirmed that audit practice does indeed mute – but not 
eliminate – accounting data distortion.  
We have thus advanced the state of performance management scholarship by: (i) articulating 
the complete categorical trinity of detection as it relates to performance management, (ii) 
demonstrating the means by which accounting data can be distorted, (iii) demonstrating an 
empirical technique for discerning gaming from mere measurement error and (iv) empirically 
demonstrating the effect of audit practice on muting the level of gaming of accounting data 
used for performance management purposes. However, we recognise that some questions 
raised in the scholarly literature on performance management remain to be answered.  
In particular, we believe that it is important to do further work to identify the motivations of 
council executives which appear to have been involved in data distortion, notwithstanding the 
recognised obstacles to this sort of investigation. One way forward might be to conduct an 
anonymous survey of council executives which our empirical strategies suggest were 




where intent was admitted, the motivations for doing so. It might also be helpful to refine the 
empirical strategies which have hitherto been used in the scholarly literature to identify 
unexpected movements in accounting data with a view to mitigating the problems which give 
rise to minor upside error in order to provide more nuanced analysis of gaming behaviours. 
In sum, this study confirms the assertion of Bird et al. (2005: 10) that ‘failure to design, and 
audit properly, a robust PM protocol is false economy because to buy cheap methodology is 
to buy dear in the longer term if subsequent audit or independent critique discovers problems 
with performance data which have been influential in public policy debate’. 
 
Endnotes 
1. The April 2013 TCorp report detailed the broad empirical process used in FFTF – we therefore analyse data 
from the June 30 2014 financial year statements. 
 
2 The ILGRP (2013) provided a table of suggested amalgamation partners for councils that they believed should 
consider amalgamation. However, the OLG (2014) left it to the councils themselves to negotiate with potential 
amalgamation partners. In October 2015 the majority of the 152 councils in NSW councils had been assessed as 
‘unfit for the future’ – despite their claims to the contrary – by an arms-length authority of the NSW 
Government, the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART; see IPART 2015). At the time of 
writing the outcomes of the reform process, despite it being initiated in 2011, were by no means clear. For 
instance, several councils are currently contesting amalgamation directives in the Courts (Davies 2016). 
 
3 One council is missing from the following analysis owing to the fact that it was under administration during 




Andrews, R., Boyne, G., Law, J. and Walker, R. 2005. ‘External Constraints on Local 
Service Standards: The Case of Comprehensive Performance Assessment in English 
Local Government’. Public Administration 83(3): 639-656. 
AO NSW [Audit Office, Auditor General, New South Wales Government] 2012. New South 
Wales Auditor-General’s Report Performance Audit – Management Local 
Government. Sydney: AO NSW, 
http://www.audit.nsw.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/249/01_Management_Local_Gover
nment_Full_Report_3.pdf.aspx?Embed=Y (accessed 13 July 2015). 
ABS [Australian Bureau of Statistics] 2011. Census of Population and Housing. Canberra: 
ABS. 
Bell, A. (2015). Blacktown Mayor Stephen Bali Rejects IPART Fit for the Future Findings. 
Daily Telegraph, 20 October, 2015. 
Bevan, G. and Hood, C. 2006. ‘What’s Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the 
English Public Health Care System’. Public Administration 84(3): 517-538. 
Bird, S., Cox, D., Farewell, V., Goldstein, H., Holt, T. and Smith, P. 2005. ‘Performance 
Indicators: Good, Bad, and Ugly’. Journal of Royal Statistical Society. 168(1): 1-27. 
Bohte, J. and Meier, K. 2000. ‘Goal Displacement: Assessing the Motivation for 




Copeland, R. 1968. ‘Income Smoothing’. Journal of Accounting Research 6: 101-116. 
Davies, A. 2016. ‘Council merger rebellion spreads to the bush’. Sydney Morning Herald 
http://www.smh.com.au/nsw/councils-merger-rebellion-spreads-to-the-bush-
20160415-go7en9.html (accessed 24 April 2016). 
Drew, J. and Dollery, B.E. 2015a. ‘Inconsistent Depreciation Practice and Public 
Policymaking: Local Government Reform in New South Wales’. Australian 
Accounting Review 25(1): 28-37. 
Drew, J. and Dollery, B. 2015b. Less Haste More Speed: The Fit for Future Reform Program 
in New South Wales Local Government. Australian Journal of Public 
Administration 75(1): 78-88. 
Electoral Commission NSW. 2014. Local Government. 
https://www.elections.nsw.gov.au/about_elections/Elections_for_each_level_of_gov
ernment/local (accessed 13 July 2015). 
Grant, B., Dollery, B. and Kortt, M. 2015a. Is there a case for mandating directly elected 
‘semi-executive’ mayors in Australian local government? Lessons from the 2012 
Queensland local government elections. Australian Journal of Public Administration 
74(4): 484–-494. 
Hay Shire Council. 2014. General Purpose Financial Statements 2013/14. Hay: Hay Shire 
Council. 
Hood, C. 2002. ‘Control, Bargains and Cheating: The Politics of Public-Service Reform’. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 12(3): 309-332. 
Hribar, P. and Collins, D. 2002. ‘Errors in Estimating Accruals: Implications for Empirical 
Research’. Accounting Research 40(1): 105-134. 
ILGRP [Independent Local Government Review Panel]. 2013. Revitalising Local 
Government. Sydney: Independent Local Government Review. 
IPART [Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal]. 2015. Assessment of Council Fit for 
the Future Proposals. Sydney: IPART. 
Le Grand, J. 2003. Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: Of Knights & Knaves, Pawns & 
Queens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Le Grand, J. 2010. ‘Knights and Knaves Return: Public Service Motivation and the Delivery 
of Public Services’. International Public Management Journal 13(1): 56-71. 
Marquardt, C. and Wiedman, C. 2004. ‘How Are Earnings Managed? An Examination of 
Specific Accruals’. Conte 
mporary Accounting Research 21(2): 461-491. 
Marsh, D. and McConnell, A. 2010. ‘Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success’. 
Public Administration 88(2): 564-583. 
Mulford, C. and Comiskey, E. 2002. The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative 
Accounting Practices. New York: John Wiley and Sons.  
NSW Government. 2016. Stronger councils stronger communities. Background > 
Consultation. https://www.strongercouncils.nsw.gov.au/background/ (accessed 23 
June 2016). 
OLG [Office of Local Government]. 2014. Becoming Fit For The Future. 
http://www.fitforthefuture.nsw.gov.au/for-councils (accessed 13 July 2015). 
Pilcher, R. 2005. ‘Local Government Financial Key Performance Indicators – Not So 
Relevant, Reliable and Accountable’. International Journal of Productivity and 
Performance Management 54(5/6): 451.467. 
Pilcher, R. 2006. ‘The Smoothing Potential of Depreciation for Local Authorities’. Journal of 




Pilcher, R. and Van Der Zahn, M. 2010. ‘Local Governments Unexpected Depreciation and 
Financial Performance Adjustment’. Financial Accountability & Management 26(3): 
299-323. 
TCorp [Treasury Corporation of NSW]. 2013. Financial Sustainability of the New South 
Wales Local Government Sector. Sydney: TCorp, 
http://www.olg.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/TCorp-Report-Financial-
Sustainability-of-the-New-South-Wales-Local-Government-Sector-April-2013.pdf 
(accessed 13 July 2015). 
Tweed Daily News. 2013. Elliot Attacks Government Over Tweed Amalgamation. Tweed 
Daily News, 30th April, 2013. 
Twomey, A. 2012. ‘Always the Bridesmaid – Constitutional Recognition of Local 
Government’. Monash University Law Review 38(2): 142-180. 
 
 
Table 1: Fit For Future Performance Management Ratios for NSW Local Governments. 
Financial Ratio Definition Fit For The Future 
Operating ratio (operating revenue † - operating expenses) / 
operating revenue †. 
>0.0% over 3 years 
Own Source rates, utilities and charges / total operating 
revenue ‡. 
>60% over 3 years 
Debt Service  EBITDA / (principal repayments + 
borrowing costs). 
0 to 20% over 3 years 
Infrastructure 
backlog 
estimated cost to bring assets to a satisfactory 
condition / total infrastructure assets. 




actual asset maintenance / required asset 
maintenance. 




Asset renewals / depreciation of building and 
infrastructure assets. 
>100% over 3 years 
Efficiency Real operating expenditure per capita  Five years – no 
threshold articulated 
Source: Office of Local Government (2014) 
† revenue excludes capital grants and contributions 
‡ revenue includes capital grants and contributions 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Means of Performance Management 
Manipulation, 2013/14 ($000) 
Financial Statement 
Item 
Quartile 1 (Q1) Median Quartile 3 (Q3) 
Depreciation 5,387 9,361 17,749 
Estimated Cost to 
Bring to a 
Satisfactory 
Standard 






3,291 6,330 11,610 
 




Smallest Largest Q1  Median Q 3 IQR 
Entire State       
Depreciation -70.5% 113.1% -6.3% 0.2% 4.9% 11.2% 
Cost to Bring to Satisfactory 
Standard 
-124.5% 462.8% -48.6% -13.5% 8.4% 57% 
Required Annual Maintenance -151.6% 950% -48.8% -11.4% 14.1% 62.9% 
Greater Sydney       
Depreciation -70.5% 27.7% -6.5% 2.0% 7.1% 13.6% 
Cost to Bring to Satisfactory 
Standard 
-124.5% 345.6% -36.7% -9.0% 9.7% 46.4% 
Required Annual Maintenance -127.1% 723.3% -29.4% 1.4% 32.9% 62.3% 
Outside Greater Sydney       
Depreciation -65.5% 113.1% -6.0% -0.1% 3.8% 9.8% 
Cost to Bring to Satisfactory 
Standard 
-102.6% 462.8% -49.9% -13.7% 8.2% 58.1% 
Required Annual Maintenance -151.6% 950% -51.3% -13.3% 6.8% 58.1% 
 
Table 4. Associations For Unexpected Financial Statement Items 2013/14 Financial 
Year, New South Wales3 
 Unexpected 
Depreciation 





























































0.3129 0.2578 0.2577 
n 151 151 151 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
